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KANTIAN ANTI-THEODICY AND JOB’S SINCERITY  
Abstract. In his essay “On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy,” Immanuel Kant uses 
the literary figures of Job and his “friends” in his argument against theodicies. According to Kant, Job’s 
sincerity (rather than his patience in suffering) is his key virtue, in contrast to his “friends.” Theodicies turn 
out  to  be  insincere  and  therefore  morally  flawed.  This  article  examines  the  problem  of  evil  from  a  
perspective integrating literary reading and philosophy, arguing that the Kantian ethical criticism of 
theodicism based on the Book of Job is highly relevant to contemporary discussions of evil and theodicy. 
I 
This essay is based on a double perspective provided by literary reading and philosophy for approaching 
the problem of evil through a critical analysis of certain (philosophical and/or theological) texts and 
characters constructed and represented in them, particularly Kant’s theodicy essay and its most important 
pre-text, the Book of Job. This methodology yields a novel approach to the familiar issue of theodicy vs. 
anti-theodicy. Our methodology differs from the more standard ways of examining philosophical ideas 
expressed in literature (for example, in works by such “philosophical” writers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert 
Camus, Samuel Beckett, or Siri Hustvedt). In the case discussed here, the use of literary figures and 
characters in a philosophical argument, rather than philosophical ideas and arguments in fictional 
literature, is central. Our discussion of the problem of evil and (anti-)theodicy seeks to show that certain 
ways of writing—especially of authoring a theodicy—could themselves be argued to exemplify moral 
vices and thereby to contribute to evil, instead of excusing or justifying it. That is, even intellectually 
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outstanding academic contributions to the problem of evil might be vulnerable to devastating ethical 
critique. Demonstrating this requires an integration of literary and philosophical modes of discourse, 
analysis, and argumentation. 
Other obvious literary references dealing with theodicy and the problem of evil would include, 
for example, Milton’s Paradise Lost (to  which  we  owe the  phrase  describing  the  task  of  all  theodicies,  
“justify[ing] the ways of God to men,” 1.26) and Voltaire’s Candide (a famous critique of Leibniz’s 
theodicy). Philosophical investigations of evil also often comment on literature.1 Here we cannot discuss 
these various works, classical or modern, in any detail. We are neither biblical scholars nor dedicated 
Kant  specialists.  What  we  do  argue  is  that  a  certain  anti-theodicist  line  of  argument  rather  naturally  
emerges from Kant’s theodicy essay when it is read with a focus on the literary characters familiar from 
the Book of Job. Genre devices and different narrative patterns are important elements in constructing 
the argument in Job’s story, and these literary features need to be studied further in order to understand 
Kant’s views on anti-theodicy and providence.2 Before turning to Kant (and the Book of Job), we must, 
however, briefly review the theodicist state of the art in contemporary philosophy of religion, against 
which our argument will develop. In particular, we will show how the Kantian criticism of Job’s “friends” 
can be employed against contemporary theodicism. This criticism is not merely intellectual but essentially 
ethical: while Job’s most important virtue, from the Kantian perspective, turns out to be his sincerity, the 
friends’ theodicist vice is a certain kind of insincerity. 
 
II 
The mainstream approach to the problem of evil in contemporary Anglo-American (broadly 
analytic) philosophy of religion is, arguably, strongly theodicist. By “theodicism” we refer to all attempts to 
deal with the problem of evil that regard theodicy as a desideratum of theism, irrespective of whether 
they end up defending theism or rejecting it. Generally, theodicies seek a justification, legitimation, 
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and/or excusing of an omnipotent, omniscient, and absolutely benevolent God allowing the world (His 
creation) to contain evil. The theodicist can be an atheist, insofar as s/he concludes that God does not 
exist (or probably does not exist, or that there is no justification for the belief that God exists) precisely 
because the theodicist desideratum cannot be fulfilled. In addition, those who offer a mere “defense”—
instead of a theodicy proper—can be regarded as theodicists in the sense that they also seek to defend 
God and account for God’s justice by arguing that, for all we know, God could have ethically acceptable 
reasons to allow the world to contain evil, even on the massive scale familiar to us.  
Accordingly, the theodicist project in contemporary philosophy of religion is not restricted to 
those thinkers who offer explicit theodicies, such as Richard Swinburne (defending a version of the “free 
will theodicy”) and John Hick (“soul-making theodicy”)—in most cases with an admirable history going 
back to, say, Augustine and Irenaeus, respectively—but also includes those who provide us with mere 
“defenses” (e.g., Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen, according to whom the “free will defense” must 
be distinguished from any “free will theodicy”). The theodicist project encompasses even those, such as 
Marilyn McCord Adams, who reject all standard theodicies as morally unacceptable “instrumental” 
justifications of evil while still appealing to a post-mortem “beatific” metaphysical divine compensation 
for the injustices and sufferings of the empirical world.3 
Moreover, theodicism and evidentialism are closely connected. As mainstream philosophy of 
religion today is evidentialist (in a broad sense), it is also understandably strongly theodicist whenever 
dealing with the problem of evil. That is, evil is in most cases seen as an empirical premise challenging 
theism in the context of an argumentative exchange searching evidence in support of, or against, the 
theistic hypothesis. This is so irrespective of whether the problem of evil is regarded as a logical or as an 
evidential problem.4 Just as theodicism is a normative view according to which any rationally acceptable 
theism ought to formulate a theodicy (or at least take steps toward the direction of a theodicy by 
formulating a skeptical defense), evidentialism is a normative epistemological view according to which 
any rationally acceptable theism ought to be defended by means of evidence. 
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Theodicism is, then, a specific dimension of evidentialism: it tells us how we should discuss the 
problem of evil when evil is regarded as a piece of evidence against theism that the theist needs to deal 
with. We are not claiming that there is any logical entailment between theodicism and evidentialism; we 
may allow the possibility of positions that are theodicist and anti-evidentialist, or anti-theodicist and 
evidentialist. But in most cases the two do go well together and are natural companions. Therefore, the 
Kantian criticism of theodicism is relevant (though hardly decisive) against evidentialism in general. 
 
III 
Immanuel Kant’s 1791 essay, “Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der 
Theodicee” (On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy), is a largely neglected piece that 
usually does not get the kind of attention that Kant’s famous doctrine of “radical evil” does.5 This section 
offers a basic exposition of Kant’s essay. The next sections argue that the “authentic theodicy” Kant 
proposes is actually an anti-theodicy and that we should follow Kant in rejecting theodicies not only for 
intellectual but also for ethical (and, therefore, religious) reasons.6  
As Richard Bernstein points out in his introduction to one of the most important contributions 
to the problem of evil in the twenty-first century, Kant’s rejection of theodicies is a crucial part of his 
critical philosophy: insofar as theodicies aim at theoretical knowledge about God, they are not merely 
contingent failures but, much more strongly, impossible and must fail, given the limitations of human 
reason; on the other hand, it is by limiting the sphere of knowledge that Kant, famously, makes room for 
faith.7 Kant, therefore, is “the modern philosopher who initiates the inquiry into evil without explicit 
recourse to philosophical theodicy” and hence also leads the way in our attempt to rethink the meaning 
of evil and responsibility “after Auschwitz” (Radical Evil, p. 4).8 Kant writes about evil in a conceptual 
world entirely different from the one occupied by his most important predecessors, such as Leibniz. 
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Kant opens his essay by defining “theodicy” as “the defense of the highest wisdom of the creator 
against the charge which reason brings against it for whatever is counterpurposive in the world” (8:255). 
Whoever authors a theodicy must prove “either that whatever in the world we judge counterpurposive is 
not so; or,  if  there is  any such thing,  that  it  must be judged not at  all  as  an intended effect  but as the 
unavoidable consequence of the nature of things; or, finally, that it must at least be considered not as an 
intended effect of the creator of all things but, rather, merely of those beings in the world to whom 
something can be imputed, i.e., of human beings” (8:255). “Counterpurposiveness” (Zweckwidrigkeit) can 
be divided into three categories: (i) the “absolutely counterpurposive, or what cannot be condoned or 
desired either as end or means,” that is, the “morally counterpurposive,” or “evil proper (sin)”; (ii) the 
“conditionally counterpurposive, or what can indeed never co-exist with the wisdom of a will as end, yet 
can  do  so  as  means,”  that  is,  the  “physically  counterpurposive,”  or  “ill  (pain)”;  and  (iii)  a  
counterpurposiveness regarding “the proportion of ill to moral evil,” that is, “the disproportion between 
crimes and penalties in the world” (8:256–57). These challenge the “world-author’s” or creator’s (God’s) 
holiness, goodness, and justice, respectively—that is, the three attributes that according to Kant 
conjunctively constitute the “moral concept of God” (8:257). This multidimensional challenge thus puts 
God on moral trial. 
Kant moves on to consider, in his architectonic style, the theodicies that can be proposed as 
counterarguments to the criticisms of the creator, focusing on the three kinds of counterpurposiveness. 
First, he distinguishes three ways of countering complaints regarding the holiness of the divine will. Among 
these, he first considers the claim that divine wisdom has “totally different rules” from human wisdom; 
“the ways of the most high are not our ways (sunt supris sua iura)” and are thus incomprehensible to us 
(8:258). He notes: “This apology, in which the vindication is worse than the complaint, needs no 
refutation” (8:258). The mere appeal to divine rules being different from ours turns God into a monster 
that does not care about morality (as we know it) at all. Second, God could be excused from the moral 
evil in the world (whose actuality is not denied) by maintaining that it “could not be prevented, because 
founded upon the limitations of the nature of human beings, as finite” (8:258–59). Here the problem is 
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that  “the  evil  would  thereby  be  justified,  and,  since  it  could  not  be  attributed  to  human  beings  as  
something for which they are to be blamed, we would have to cease calling it ‘a moral evil’” (8:259). 
Third, it may be suggested that there is indeed moral evil in the world, but we human beings are guilty 
for it, and “no guilt may be ascribed to God, for God has merely tolerated it for just causes as a deed of 
human beings” (8:259). This leads back to the previous complaint: as God could not prevent such evil 
without violating other moral ends, human beings cannot be held responsible for such evil, as it is 
grounded in “the essence of things” and “the necessary limitations of humanity” (8:259). 
The second set of attempted theodicies focuses on complaints about divine goodness. The first 
attempt says that we prefer being alive to being dead, even if life involves ills and pains; this Kant refutes 
as mere “sophistry” (8:259). According to the second vindication, “the preponderance of painful feelings 
over pleasant ones cannot be separated from the nature of an animal creature such as the human being,” 
but this leads to the question of “why the creator of our existence called us into life when [life] is not 
desirable to us” (8:260). The third theodicy in this group refers to “future happiness,” suggesting that we 
ought to become worthy of our future glory “through our struggle with adversities.”9 Again, this is only 
something that can be “pretended,” but there can be no “insight into it” (8:260). 
Kant’s third group of failed theodicies addresses divine justice, the “justice of the world’s judge” 
(8:260). Again these come in three versions. The first says that “every crime already carries with it its due 
punishment” in one’s tormented conscience and hence denies that “the depraved go unpunished” 
(8:261). Here, Kant notes, “the virtuous man lends to the depraved the characteristic of his own 
constitution” (8:261); in reality, conscience does not seem to torment all wrongdoers. It could, secondly, 
be maintained that “it is a property of virtue that it should wrestle with adversities . . . , and sufferings 
only serve to enhance the value of virtue” (8:261). However, if an end of life “crown[ing] virtue” fails to 
materialize, the virtuous may have unjustly suffered—not in order for her/his virtue to be pure “but 
because it was pure”; moreover, the possibility that there is something after our “terrestrial life” cannot be 
regarded as a vindication of divine providence (8:261–62). The third and final attempt in this category 
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points out that we must in this world judge well-being and ill “merely as the consequence of the use of 
the human faculties according to the laws of nature,” instead of judging them “according to their 
agreement with supersensible ends” (8:262). Again, this remains “arbitrary”: we cannot appeal to a future 
world in which things would be different; even if we had moral reasons for religiously believing in such 
a world, that belief could not play a role in the argument supporting the justice of God (8:262). 
Having refuted these attempts at vindication, Kant concludes, “Every previous theodicy has not 
performed what it promised, namely the vindication of the moral wisdom of the world-government [or 
God] against the doubts raised against it on the basis of what the experience of this world teaches” 
(8:263). However, in order to finally conclude the “trial,” it must be considered whether “our reason is 
absolutely incapable of insight into the relationship in which any world as we may ever become acquainted with through 
experience stands with respect to the highest wisdom”; accordingly, a piece of “negative wisdom” must be 
established by demonstrating that there is a “necessary limitation of what we may presume with respect 
to that which is too high for us” (8:263).10  
After completing his negative task of refuting all previous theodicies, Kant points out, however, 
that a theodicy as “an interpretation of nature insofar as God announces his will through it” can be either 
“doctrinal” or “authentic” and that only doctrinal theodicies, or philosophical trials constituting 
“theodicy proper,” have been refuted (8:264). He has refuted what philosophers like Leibniz or (much 
later)  Swinburne  and  McCord  Adams  have  attempted  in  the  way  of  theodicy.  What  remains  is  the  
possibility of an “authentic theodicy” as “the mere dismissal of all objections against divine wisdom” as a 
“pronouncement of the same reason through which we form our concept of God . . . as a moral and 
wise being,” that is, of the reason through which God himself becomes “the interpreter of his will as 
announced through creation” (8:264). This authentic theodicy is an interpretation of “an efficacious 
practical reason,” instead of that of “a ratiocinating (speculative) reason,” and it can be regarded as “the 
unmediated definition and voice of God” (8:264). Here, Kant turns to the Book of Job, where he claims 
to find an authentic interpretation allegorically expressed. 
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IV 
The translator of Kant’s theodicy essay, George di Giovanni, calls it one of the most artistically 
successful pieces of Kant’s oeuvre. The impetus for this remark is the central passage of the text, where 
Kant turns to Job’s poetic story as an allegory of theodicy and a representation of virtue and describes 
Job, as portrayed in the book, as moving and edifying in his sincerity. Kant is not alone in giving the 
Book of Job an important place in philosophical arguments; it was the most frequently commented and 
translated book of the Bible during the German and English Enlightenments.11 The Book of Job has 
been examined in relation to a number of genres, such as lamentation, wisdom literature, and sufferer 
narratives. The so-called Babylonian Theodicy from the ancient Near East is often mentioned as another 
famous representative of a wisdom dialogue, where the discussants debate the meaning of suffering, 
thereby representing two rival ways of understanding the moral order of the world.12 Job’s story has also 
been read as a typical example of a trial narrative, where “the protagonist is subjected to a series of tests, 
ordeals, or temptations, so that the suffering and hardships are always viewed from the perspective of 
what can be learnt about the protagonist based on how he or she responds to adversity” and therefore 
“the concerns of trial narratives are epistemic rather than existential.”13 Job’s case also has similarities to 
courtroom narratives, since it abounds in legal imagery (defenses, accusations, judges, etc.). This generic 
background is notable precisely because one of the key questions here concerns the justice of God and 
the reasons of Job’s suffering. Kant calls the whole question of theodicy a “juridical process” (Rechtshandel 
in the German original, 8:255).14 
For the Church Fathers, Job’s characteristic virtue was his patience.15 Job served as the exemplum 
of a man who did not lose his faith but remained steadfast (the virtue of constantia) in piety and preserved 
a certain peacefulness of mind even in the midst of extreme affliction and hardship; he patiently endured 
the wounds of torments, and his pains and adversities strengthened and demonstrated his virtue. 
Chrysostom called him the athlete of piety who successfully struggled to keep his faith, and both St. John 
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Chrysostom and Gregory the Great described Job’s wounds as windows allowing the splendor of his 
inner virtue to shine forth to the world.16  
However, instead of focusing on patience, Kant studied another virtue in Job’s character. Job’s 
key virtue here is his sincerity (Aufrichtigkeit), which establishes “the preeminence of the honest man over 
the religious flatterer in the divine verdict” (8:267): “Job speaks as he thinks, and with the courage with 
which he, as well as every human being in his position, can well afford; his friends, on the contrary, speak 
as if they were being secretly listened to by the mighty one, over whose cause they are passing judgment, 
and as if gaining his favor through their judgment were closer to their heart than the truth. Their malice 
in pretending to assert things into which they yet must admit they have no insight, and in simulating a 
conviction which they in fact do not have, contrasts with Job’s frankness” (8:265–66). 
For Kant, the leading feature in Job’s virtuous character is not his endurance and courage in 
adversities but his inner sincerity, integrity, and honesty, which he does not lose although all the 
circumstances seem to prove that he must have sinned, because otherwise his suffering would have been 
mindless. Job vehemently protests against his suffering in the poetic dialogues; he does not quietly suffer 
his distress, as he is often depicted in traditional iconography, but complaints and insists on the injustice 
of his adversities.17 Thus, Job’s honesty of heart, rather than his alleged patience, is his greatest virtue. 
Another important shift Kant makes here is that he stresses Job’s virtue by contrasting it with the 
more negatively depicted group of friends, who offer a different perspective on suffering and in their 
flattering dishonesty serve as a counterimage to Job’s sincerity. Kant, after all, refers to the “malice” of 
Job’s friends. If earlier traditions were more sympathetic to Job’s friends and aligned with their views, 
Enlightenment critics were more inclined to identify with Job, who questions the moral order implied by 
theodicy. In the Book of Job, the antagonism between Job and his friends is constructed by different 
narrative means, which direct the reader’s sympathies and decisions about the righteousness of the 
different parties. Job stands out as an isolated hero and the uncontested protagonist of the story. This is 
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typical of trial narratives, which are “radically individuating and isolating” and always test the person 
individually (“Trials and Tragedies,” p. 132).  
Job’s friends, by contrast, are given only a subordinate place in the narrative frame; this restricted 
position already undermines the validity of their arguments and has its parallels in other major Western 
narratives, such as Homer’s Odyssey; Odysseus is the hero who remains firm while his men fail (e.g., while 
listening to the Sirens’ song or when Circe turns Odysseus’s men into pigs). Job’s friends play the part of 
an anonymous, erring collective reasoning in the story; even Job openly scorns their platitudes.18 While 
they do not recognize Job as the one who does not err, they draw wrong conclusions about his condition 
and hence of the human experience in general. They can also be associated with other mistaken groups, 
such as the two disciples of Christ who, on the road to Emmaus, did not recognize their master and thus 
made a grave misjudgment. Job is also placed in an isolated position in order to present him as a single 
victim of the collective enemies, who are unanimously against him. 
There are many crucial differences between Job and his companions, but the most important 
ones have a moral basis. Therefore, the intellectual, ethical, and religious vices of Job’s friends deserve 
more  detailed  attention.  The  friends’  major  failure  is  that  they  try  to  give  rational  and  dogmatic  
explanations to Job’s unwarranted suffering, and thus they represent (false) theodicy, that is, official and 
normative views of faith trying to justify God’s goodness and justice despite contrary experience and 
evidence. It has been noted that judicial or legal discourse characterizes Job’s speech in particular, as he 
demands reasons for his condition and accuses God of injustice, whereas the friends rely on traditional 
religious arguments, and their ideology is stronger than the legal discourse. They maintain that since God 
is good, he does not allow purposeless suffering, and therefore Job must have sinned, since suffering 
follows sin as its punishment. Kant argues that the discourse of the friends would probably be successful 
and persuasive in front of synods, official councils, and other religious institutions supporting traditional, 
theoretical, and rational accounts of faith, and he contrasts these official statements with Job’s drastically 
different and authentic personal experience. The friends represent theologians who are misled by the 
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tradition and its false beliefs and theological propositions. Later Girard, who gives considerable attention 
to the role of the friends, aligns them with priests and “the three inquisitors at Job’s bedside,” since they 
relentlessly try to make Job confess his guilt and consent to the community’s truth; Eliphaz in particular 
seems to enjoy great authority, since he always speaks first.19 
For Girard, the violence of the friends manifests itself in language, in “the tremendous violence 
of their speeches” (Girard, p. 21), as they demand that Job explain to the community the reasons for his 
own suffering and the evil attributed to him. As a remedy to Job’s distress, the friends offer the traditional 
religious means of self-examination and repentance, but Job rejects these conventional forms of healing, 
since his conscience is clear and he sees no reason for self-scrutiny. The friends suggest that Job confess 
his guilt and sinfulness, but unlike conventional trial stories—where the protagonist “endures the 
experience of being tested” (“Trials and Tragedies,” p. 132) and finally returns to the right and widely 
accepted order of things after some temptations—Job’s story evolves in another direction. Job protests 
not only against his suffering but also against the interpretations of God and faith maintained by his 
friends—and thus against the way in which those interpretations actually increase his suffering by falsely 
attributing moral guilt to him.  
The friends’ main goal is to justify God and their own theoretical constructions; they thereby 
deny the evidence of Job’s statements about his innocence and actual lived experience. Eager to defend 
their views about the goodness of God, they resort to fabrications, intellectual dishonesty, and even lies, 
refusing to admit that all accusations against Job are false and unjust. Job, by contrast, always speaks the 
truth and manifests moral rectitude; in Kant’s sense this means that he speaks truthfully, asserting what he 
believes to be true. Job has been called a Kantian hero (Mittleman, p. 40), who confesses that he knows 
nothing and refuses recourse to conventional metaphysical views to relieve his doubt or his painful 
situation. 
The falsity of the friends’ views also stems from their intellectual efforts to construct tenable 
narratives in order to explain Job’s turmoil, and thus their mistake has a moral basis. Especially after the 
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Second World War, critics have emphasized that narrative means can be ethically problematic in trying 
to make sense of individual suffering. Relying on this interpretative approach, Carol A. Newsom has 
analyzed how the friends (falsely) attempt to reduce and integrate Job’s experience (and also God’s 
reasons) to larger narrative structures that would explain the causes and consequences of Job’s suffering.20 
Newsom points out that in trying to integrate Job’s experience of meaningless suffering by their 
traditional narrative patterns, the friends perform an unethical act, since these patterns (e.g., stories of 
the bad fate of the wicked or the hope of the virtuous) fail to do justice to Job’s authentic experience—
his testimony—and deny his own considerations of his condition. Job sees no narrative whole or 
conclusion that would relieve or explain his condition, but merely purposeless repetition, relentless pain 
and suffering for no reason. The friends suggest that by praying, Job would attain an order in his affliction, 
but a meaningful moral order is precisely what Job is fundamentally lacking in his suffering. He insists 
that his suffering cannot be reduced to any storylines with initiative causes and their effects, or relieved 
by therapeutic prayers or by the friends’ consolations (see Job 16:2–5). Nor can it, as Newsom observes, 
be explained with reference to such conventional narrative images as that of transformation, survival or 
hope (see Job 11:18, 17:13), which would integrate Job’s suffering into a graspable story. As Newsom 
claims (“Friends,” p. 242), Job questions the narratability of his violent experience.21 
The falsity of the friends’ views is also based on the inscrutability of God’s reasons; they wrongly 
believe that divine judgment can be understood with the same logic as human action, as if God followed 
the same human moral order.22 Teleology exists only in human explanations, which build narratives and 
identify causes and their  effects.  But God’s knowledge is  not like human knowledge,  and it  would be 
blasphemy even to claim so. Kant emphasizes that the problem of evil and suffering cannot be explained 
rationally or by appealing to such simple narrative and doctrinal patterns as punishment and reward, and 
we human beings should recognize and acknowledge the limits of reason. Otherwise our fabrications are 
in danger of turning into lies. It would be childish to think that external worldly goods are rewards from 
God, and it would be equally naïve and idle to state that human beings’ misfortunes are punishments for 
their sins. As Alan Mittleman argues (Mittleman, p. 35), with reference to Moses Maimonides’s views, 
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such statements and ideas are entirely derived from the human world, although they pretend metaphysical 
knowledge of divine intentions and goals that cannot be known. We need teleological ideas and narrations 
in order to make sense of the world, but these constructions should not be presupposed as true. In this 
view, Job’s friends represent theodicy falsely maintaining that divine causes can be illuminated by 
speculative human reason. Another mistake the supporters of theodicy make is that, in their view, the 
world is purposeful, ordered, and teleological, although Job’s lived experience denies any sensible 
causality. Instead of building explanations and appealing to fictive causation, they should aim to relieve 
misery by helping the victims. The courtroom narrative comes to the conclusion that there is no justice—
in the human sense—in the world, since the plague strikes the good and the bad without distinction. 
While Kant engages in no detailed analysis of the narrative structures of the Book of Job, his 
philosophical sympathies clearly lie on Job’s side, instead of on the side of Job’s friends. For Kant, Job’s 
story is in fact not as much about his relationship to God as it is about his relationship to other human 
beings. Girard maintains that Job is not ethically mistreated only by his friends or by God; he also 
becomes the scapegoat of the whole community. Girard claims that God is not responsible for the 
suffering Job experiences, but Job is essentially the victim of the people, as his truth remains unheard23 
and he becomes the object of the community’s collective, social violence. Thus Job’s story acquires new 
meanings as the story about the order, which names the blameless crowd and the guilty victim.24 
God’s speech to Job in Chapter 38 famously lays out the “inscrutability” of the divinely created 
world system, also showing Job, according to Kant, its “horrible side” with destructiveness and 
counterpurposiveness (8:266). What remains through Job’s encounter with God is Job’s honesty and “his 
faith on morality” (rather than any “morality on faith”): only the former kind of faith, based on honesty, 
can be a foundation of “a religion of good life conduct” (8:267). This faith, in a way (admittedly slightly 
anachronistically), turns Job into a Kantian moral thinker, while representing his friends as 
exemplifications of the moral vices of rationalizing theodicies. In contrast, for the purposes of an 
authentic theodicy, “sincerity in taking notice of the impotence of our reason” and “honesty in not 
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distorting our thoughts in what we say” are key virtues (8:267). Sincerity, in short, is “the principal 
requirement in matters of faith” (8:267). While we cannot know for certain whether what we say is true, 
because we could always be mistaken, we can and must “stand by the truthfulness” of what we say (8:267). 
Hence, the moral vices of theodicism are in the end related to one of the worst vices of Kantian ethics, 
namely, lying (see 8:268–69).25 
Kant regards insincerity—our tendency “to distort even inner declarations before [our] own 
conscience”—as “in itself evil even if it harms no one” (8:270). Thus, he seems to argue that speculative 
theodicies—manifested by Job’s friends—are themselves exemplifications of evil. They are evil in a 
specific sense: they do not acknowledge the Kantian (Enlightenment) ideal of free and responsible 
thinking. They are therefore revolts, not primarily against God but against humanity itself, conceived in 
a Kantian way. The insincerity of theodicism does not recognize the essential human capacity for freedom 
and responsibility, the kind of autonomous thinking that is presupposed by morality. 
Theodicies, then, are failures to think. In this sense they interestingly resemble what Hannah Arendt 
called the banality of evil. According to Arendt’s analysis of Adolf Eichmann, the striking feature of his 
“banally” evil actions was an “inability to think.” This characterization does not, of course, mean that all 
manifestations of evil would be manifestations of banality, but it could entail that the specific evil of 
theodicies is at least related to the Arendtian banality of evil.26 Arguably, Kant’s (and Arendt’s) criticism 
of the failure to think as a vice of theodicism adds a powerful argument to the resources of “moral anti-
theodicism.” 
 
V 
However, is the Kantian criticism of rationalizing theodicies sufficient? This is a question we may 
still ask even after having found it a powerful case against traditional theodicies. Kant’s treatment of Job 
is directly relevant to the more recent theodicy vs. anti-theodicy discussions. 
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According to Kant, an “authentic theodicy”—in contrast to rationalizing theodicies—can be 
found in the Book of Job. However, it could be argued, even by Kant’s own lights, that to offer a truly 
authentic theodicy is to offer no theodicy at all, or perhaps even more strongly to offer an anti-theodicy, 
because theodicies (of any kind) are necessarily inauthentic due to being necessarily immoral. Job’s friends 
can, moreover, be seen as analogous to the theodicist writers within the contemporary analytic philosophy 
of religion, set against the more honest attempts to deal with the problem of evil we find in post-
Holocaust philosophers of religion and political theorists like Arendt (see Eichmann in Jerusalem), Richard 
Bernstein (see Radical Evil), and Hans Jonas,27 or in novelists and other writers dealing with the 
impossibility of ever adequately representing the Holocaust or testifying for its victims, such as Primo 
Levi and Imre Kertesz.28 
Like Bernstein, Susan Neiman also emphasizes the moral unacceptability or even obscenity of 
theodicies, and finds Kant the key figure. The issue comes back to the human limitations that prevent us 
from having any theoretical knowledge about God, or even about morality (which can only be known, 
albeit a priori, from the point of view of practical reason). Knowing the connections between moral and 
natural evils would, according to Neiman’s reading of Kant, “undermine the possibility of morality,” and 
therefore solving the problem of evil is not only an impossible but an immoral project.29 Job’s 
pseudocomforters actually sin against their righteous friend and against truth itself; theodicy, in addition 
to being impossible and immoral, “tends toward blasphemy” (Neiman, p. 69). But Neiman’s account of 
Kant goes beyond the mere appeal to the limits of human knowledge and reason: “So Kant denounced 
the standard position one might call the theodicy of ignorance. . . . What’s wrong with saying that God 
has ways we cannot understand? For Kant, even this much knowledge is too much knowledge. To say 
that God has purposes, though we don’t know them, is to say that God has purposes. That’s precisely 
what was in doubt. To assert it a priori is to trade recognition of the reality of suffering for a consolation 
so abstract it cannot really comfort” (Neiman, p. 69).30 
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Accordingly, the kind of inscrutability of evil that Bernstein and others legitimately insist on must 
not be confused with the appeal to God’s hidden purposes. To admit, in an anti-theodicistic manner, that 
evil remains mysterious and inscrutable to us is not to claim, superstitiously, that there are (or that there 
might be) hidden purposes we cannot know. Both are appeals to human finitude, but only the former is 
morally sincere, avoiding the latter’s metaphysical postulation of or speculation with hidden purposes. As 
we have seen, the figure modeling nonspeculative sincerity here is Job, whereas his friends embody the 
vices of superstition, insincerity, and blasphemy. 
Moreover, the fact that those vices are in the end blasphemous is fully compatible with theodicies’ 
being violations of the Enlightenment principles of free and responsible thought. This is one indication 
of the way in which anti-theodicism leads us to question the allegedly sharp dichotomy between 
religious/theological and secular approaches to fundamental human problems such as evil and suffering. 
Such distinctions may be less important than the morally fundamental division between theodicism and 
anti-theodicism. Indeed, given that the moral law is, for Kant, the ground of religion, not the other way 
around, the worst thing about theodicies is not that they are blasphemous but that they are immoral. In 
Kantian terms, it is against our moral obligation of treating all human beings, including ourselves, always 
also as ends in themselves (instead of ever treating them as mere means)31 to offer instrumentalizing 
theodicies according to which evil and suffering serve some purpose. We do not need any elaborate 
theological construction that shows theodicies to be blasphemous in some technical sense; what we need 
is some (more) moral philosophy.  
We can say, then, that theodicies are, from a Kantian perspective, morally wrong because they 
tend to forget our fundamental human finitude. This is also why they are blasphemous, but that 
theological vice is derived from their moral vice. We may also say that Kant’s radical anti-theodicism is 
rooted (recall the etymology of “radical” in the Latin radix, root) in his general theory of humanity, 
particularly human limits and finitude. We may, furthermore, connect all this with Kant’s views on radical 
evil (which we have generally set aside here), perceiving that for Kant radical evil amounts to the 
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tendency—rooted in us—to prioritize maxims that set our own welfare before the requirements of moral 
law. Because our engagement in theodicist speculations does precisely this by treating suffering human 
beings as instruments for some greater good and by setting, in a sense, the theological peace of mind of 
the rationalizing theodicist prior to this moral duty to attend to the other’s suffering, the construction of 
theodicies is itself, by Kantian lights, evil, or even radically evil. Therefore, in short, theodicy, qua 
immoral, may itself be radically evil.32 
Astonishingly, some philosophers and theologians still maintain that a purely theoretical 
(theodicist) perspective is adequate for dealing with the problem of evil. Kant, who more generally is a 
paradigmatic case of a rigorously intellectual approach to morality, knew better and found it necessary to 
explore an ancient literary text in order to address this problem. The Kantian anti-theodicist can easily 
agree with C. Fred Alford who, in his illuminating comparison of the Book of Job with Primo Levi’s 
Holocaust writings, suggests, “The innocent and good suffer for no discernable reason, a problem made 
even more acute when one imagines that it is God who causes us to suffer. When we are confronted with 
this terrible thought (traditionally called ‘the problem of theodicy’), only the poetic form can save us. For 
the poetic narrative acts to hold and support us .  .  .  as  we learn the terrible truth.  Poetic form allows 
narrative content to be heard and accepted, content that would otherwise be too terrifying to 
contemplate” (Alford, p. 55). 
What does our analysis show, then, about the ways in which literary theorists focusing on 
structures of poetic narrative and philosophers focusing on conceptual and argumentative structures can 
join forces in attempts to understand evil and suffering? While this essay has, we hope, taken some steps 
toward articulating a coherent anti-theodicist approach to these issues, it can also be seen as a case study 
whose relevance extends beyond this specific topic. A philosophico-literary study of texts, characters, 
and narrative structures may analogously illuminate other humanly significant themes such as knowledge, 
existence, or meaning.  
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